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Abstract 
This paper seeks to answer the question of how US-Mexico border policy came to be defined by 
strategies which prioritize migration as a threat to national security and migrants as criminal 
conduits. In contrast to recent assignments of this origin in the presidency of Donald Trump, or 
older insistence that it came about in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, I 
instead argue that this policy direction came about much earlier. Using Fiona Adamson and 
Gerasimos Tsourapas’ theory of migration diplomacy and their criticism of James Hollifield’s 
migration state as a framework, I assess the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement as a 
more accurate point of origin. First, NAFTA is evaluated as the central cause of emigration surge 
across the border-zone, which then incurred an American security response through migration 
policy. Then, NAFTA is evaluated as the representation of a failed development strategy in 
Mexico, which then pivoted to focus on performing development by intensifying Mexican 
security apparatuses toward migrants. While the first two sections are broadly focused on the 
US-Mexico relationship, the final section focuses on how this relationship has come to affect the 
one between Mexico and Central America as Central Americans have grown to make up a 
majority of migrants at the border-zone. I conclude by attesting to the need for a reassessment of 
the border “crisis” and call for further research into the effect of Mexican party politics on the 
subject and time period in question. 
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List of Abbreviations 
ACA   Asylum Cooperation Agreement 
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PRI   Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 
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De Jesus 2 
 
Introduction 
 The era of American President Donald Trump has put an increased spotlight on migration 
from America’s southern border with Mexico. An administration that very loudly and publicly 
condemns migrants as criminals and “rapists” has given way to a public consciousness which, at 
one end of the political spectrum, views migration – generally, but also migrants from Latin 
America in particular – as an ever-present scourge on the American way of life and, on the other 
end of the political spectrum, as a human rights issue intrinsically tied to the perceived evils of 
the Trump administration itself.1 The latter view may, at times, be extended further to the 
administration of President Barack “Deporter in Chief” Obama or further to the administration of 
President George W. Bush and his prioritization of public security, culminating in the much the 
creation of a major executive department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).2 All of 
these public imaginings of migration as both a phenomenon and a policy area fail to consider the 
political and historical context surrounding US-Mexican relations on the issue and how this 
bilateral relationship has forged the reality of migration in the two countries today. This reality is 
one understood both in the public eye and in policy circles as a punitive one, a system in which 
migrants are assessed on a scale of increasingly severe criminality and migration is framed first 
and foremost as an issue of national security. Today, North American governments makes use of 
a system that combines a deadly flavor of militarized policing with a bureaucratic slowness that 
many would rather circumvent than face or wait out, creating a system in which migrants are 
either actively punished or purposefully ignored. 
                                                          
1 Reilly, Katie. “Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico.” TIME. 31 August 2016. 
2 Hutchison, Hugh. “Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and 
Trump Administrations.” Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2020: 25 (1). Pg. 86. 
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 There are three central facts underlying this present reality: 1) migration securitization 
precedes the Trump era; 2) it did not first manifest as a central public security concern in the 
United States during the Bush (Jr.) era, even if the creation of the DHS and the realignment of 
American resources toward national security did escalate already-present policy orientations; and 
3) migration securitization is as much of a problem between Mexico and other sending countries 
as it is between the United States and Mexico. In taking these three central facts to assess the 
migration regime underlying policy rationale at the US-Mexico border, one can come to think 
critically about the true point of origin of these policy decisions. Some may go as far back as the 
Mexican-American War when, even with a rather porous border-zone, migration between the US 
and Mexico first became a serious policy issue.3 Others would look to the Bracero Program 
(1942-1964) as the source of the United States’ modern problem with undocumented 
immigration on which the American agricultural sector is entirely dependent.4 There are also 
many that would look to President Richard Nixon’s declaration of a “War on Drugs” in 1971 as 
the origin of the security apparatuses that would then become associated with migrants as the 
carriers of said drugs.5 (Though the Mexican War on Drugs would technically begin much later, 
one of the central tenants of American drug policy is the collaboration with Mexican officials.) 
While all arguments have their credence, all ignore one key fact of migration today: 
much, if not most, of what happens at the US-Mexico border is not necessarily in the hands of 
American Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), but of Mexican border agents, Mexican 
                                                          
3 Cárdenas, Gilberto. “United States Immigration Policy toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective.” Chicana/o 
Latina/o Law Review, 1975: 2 (0). Pg. 67. 
4 Jordan, Miriam. “Farmworkers, Mostly Undocumented, Become ‘Essential’ During Pandemic.” The New York 
Times. 2 April 2020. 
5 Harris, Gardiner. “State Dept. Official Praises Mexican Efforts in War on Drugs.” The New York Times. 2 March 
2017. 
US Congressional Research Service. Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021. Washington: Library of 
Congress, 13 January 2021. 
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immigration officials, and Mexican police. The status quo of the southern border is one that is 
perceived as defined by American doctrine, but, especially as migrant demographics have begun 
to change over the years, so has the status quo of the border-zone become increasingly dictated 
by Mexican border policy and immigration law. In essence, while it is very clear from history 
that migration has a deep effect on the relationship between the US and Mexico, it is also in turn 
affected by that relationship, as well. In looking at migration not as something that merely 
happens to the United States from Mexico, but as a tool for policymaking within the framework 
of their bilateral relationship, one can come to a proper point of origin for the state of migration 
policy in the border-zone. Even with the many possible points that could be chosen, there is one 
in which Mexico plays the unique and crucial role in its negotiation and progress: the institution 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. NAFTA is crucial not only 
because of the active role Mexico took in its implementation, but also because of its duel 
significance on either sides of the US-Mexico border, both meanings together culminating in the 
modern immigration regime that can be seen in the border-zone today. On the American side, the 
agreement created a wave of incoming migration that would instigate a series of anti-drug and 
anti-immigrant legislation and policy initiatives. On the Mexican side, NAFTA represented a 
turning point in the country’s development strategy, with its failures instituting a fundamental 
change in Mexican development theory that would cause the state to seek control in a security 
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Methodology 
Using as a theoretical basis Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas’ concept of 
migration diplomacy in their “Migration Diplomacy in World Politics,” James Hollifield’s 
illustration of the migration state in his “The Emerging Migration State,” and Adamson and 
Tsourapas’ critique of Hollifield in their “The Migration State in the Global South: 
Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management,” this paper 
seeks to demonstrate the origins of modern migrant securitization at the US-Mexico border 
(exemplified by policies like the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) and the Asylum 
Cooperation Agreements (ACAs) with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) in NAFTA. The 
argument is divided into parts coinciding with the two sides of the border and with two loosely-
defined periods of time. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of Mexico, although the United 
States and Central America are explored insofar as they maintain their relationship to Mexico. 
Though analyses may divulge into domestic policies, the main focus is kept on the diplomatic 
relationships between states. Because this research concerns the US-Mexico border-zone, 
Canada is largely excluded. 
The first half (roughly, 1994 to the mid-2010s) covers the background on NAFTA and 
the ways that it failed to stop Mexican migration, then incurring an American security response. 
Within this section, the US-Mexico relationship is explored through the lens of Adamson and 
Tsourapas’ framework of migration diplomacy, in which the control of migratory flows acts as a 
point of negotiation between nations that can be utilized to achieve greater policy goals. 
Hollifield’s liberal paradox is then used to address the conflict at the center of US participation in 
NAFTA, its subsequent relationship with Mexico, and its extreme response to increased 
immigration. The second half (covering a larger, broader length of Mexican history) approaches 
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NAFTA as a piece in a grander development project in Mexico in which securitization is a 
fundamental part. Using Adamson and Tsourapas’ model of the developmental migration state, 
Mexico’s traditional strategy is briefly explored under the parameters set by the two authors, 
then altered in favor of a more uncommon assessment of development as both policy and 
performance. These two halves, in conjunction, form a suitable timeline that reveals the trade 
agreement as the direct inception of migration relations as they have existed since between the 
US and Mexico into the mid-2010s. The final section uses the US-Mexico relationship illustrated 
under the framework of migration diplomacy to explore its counterpart in the Mexico-Central 
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Literature Review 
 It is Torpey6 who asserted that the state, the central actor in the grand scheme of 
international relations, is not only defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but 
also by its monopoly on legitimate movement, one which comes out of an inherent desire to 
preserve the sovereignty7 and security of the nation.8 Hollifield9 argued that, as nations have 
developed over time through globalization and an increasingly interconnected global economic 
system, the modern state has become defined by its ability to manage migratory flows to, from, 
and through its sovereign territory, connecting migration to previous presentations of the state as 
defined by its security apparatus in times of war or in its ability to perform international trade.10 
Domestically, migration has been assessed as a fundamental piece of government decision-
making when it comes to culture,11 internal politics,12 economic theory,13 and national security.14 
Beyond the domestic, migration effects how states conduct diplomacy – as explored by Sharp15 – 
and navigate themselves in an international framework of inter-state and inter-regional relations 
– as explored by Hamilton and Langhorne.16  Though there are notable examples of authors who 
                                                          
6 Torpey, John. “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement.’” 
Sociological Theory, Dec 2002: 16 (3). Pg. 239-259. 
7 Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
8 Adamson, Fiona B. “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security.” International Security, 
Summer 2006: 31 (1). Pg. 165-199. 
9 Hollifield, James F. “The Emerging Migration State.” The International Migration Review, Fall 2004: 38 (3). Pg. 
885-912. 
10 Rosecrance, Richard N. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: 
Basic Books, 1986. 
11 Levitt, Peggy. “Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion.” The 
International Migration Review, Winter 1998: 32 (4). Pg. 926-948. 
12 Brubaker, William Rogers. Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989. 
13 Passaris, Constantine. “Immigration and the Evolution of Economic Theory.” International Migration, Dec 1989: 
27 (4). Pg. 525-542. 
14 Adamson (2006). 
15 Sharp, Paul. Diplomatic Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
16 Hamilton, Keith & Richard Langhorne. The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration. 
London: Taylor & Francis, 2011. 
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have examined migratory flows as they effect inter-state relations, such as Teitelbaum,17 
Weiner,18 Greenhill,19 Thiollet,20 Gabaccia,21 and Oyen,22 it is Adamson and Tsourapas23 who 
conceptualize the control of migration as a form of diplomacy in itself. 
 Existing work within the field of migration studies tends to focus primarily on the 
developed democracies of the Global North and, for the most part, do not consider that 
underdeveloped countries of the Global South experience migratory in- and out-flows in 
different and unique ways.24 The development of these countries and, by extension, their 
experiences with migration, has been shaped by external intervention,25 international systemic 
influence,26 regional politics,27 and the long-term effects of colonialism.28 Further work has been 
done on the relationships between sending states and foreign diaspora populations.29 As 
Adamson and Tsourapas point out, this bias has forced the subject to split into two secondary 
                                                          
17 Teitelbaum, Michael S. “Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy.” International Organization, Summer 1984: 
38 (3). Pg. 429-450. 
18 Weiner, Myron. “Security, Stability, and International Migration.” International Security Winter 1992-1993: 17 
(3). Pg. 91-126. 
19 Greenhill, Kelly M. Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010. 
20 Thiollet, Hélène. “Migration As Diplomacy: Labor Migrants, Refugees, and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil-
Rich Countries.” International Labor and Working-Class History, Spring 2011: 79 (1). Pg. 103-121. 
21 Gabbacia, Donna R. Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012. 
22 Oyen, Meredith. The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations 
in the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
23 Adamson, Fiona B. & Gerasimos Tsourapas. “Migration Diplomacy in World Politics.” International Studies 
Perspectives, May 2019: 20 (2). Pg. 113-128. 
24 Castles, Stephen, Mark J. Miller, & Hein De Haas. The Age of Migration. New York: Guilford Press, 2014. 
25 FitzGerald, David Scott & David Cook-Martín. Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist 
Immigration Policy in the Americas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
26 Adamson (2006). 
Adamson & Tsourapas (2019). 
27 Thiollet (2011). 
Tsourapas, Gerasimos. “Nasser’s Educators and Agitators across al-Watan al-’Arabi: Tracing the Foreign Policy 
Importance of Egyptian Regional Migration, 1952–1967.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2016:  43 (3). 
Pg. 324-341. 
The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance. Ed. Geddes, Andrew, Maria Vera Espinoza, Leila Hadj Abdou, 
& LLeiza Brumat. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019. 
28 Klotz, Audie. Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
29 Tsourapas (2016). 
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subjects: “migration studies,” which focuses on labor migration in the Global North,30 and 
“refugee studies,” which focuses on displacement within the Global South. This split has divided 
the literature on the subject of migration into those focused on “economic migration, citizenship, 
rights, and integration in ‘northern’ democracies and a refugee-studies literature centered on 
humanitarian crises, mass population flows, and security issues in ‘southern’ non-democracies 
(Betts and Loescher 2010; Milner 2014).”31 States in the Global South are often portrayed 
without any sort of diplomatic agency, more so meant to act as the passive entity to which 
catastrophic events, migratory flows, and international aid happen.32 There are few authors who 
critically examine migration-related policy outside of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD),33 the colloquial marker for the world’s most developed 
countries. 
  
                                                          
30 Hollifield, James, Philip Martin, and Pia Orrenius, eds. 2014. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. 
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
31 Adamson, Fiona B. & Gerasimos Tsourapas. “The Migration State in the Global South:  Nationalizing, 
Developmental, and Neoloiberal Models of Migration Management.” International Migration Review, 2020: 54 (3). 
Pg. 855. 
32 Betts, Alexander & Paul Collier. Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System. London: Penguin, 2017. 
33 Thiollet (2011.) 
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NAFTA 
A Theoretical Background 
In recent years, NAFTA has come under major fire for, among criticisms from labor 
unions and farmworkers, being the “single worst deal ever approved.”34 President Donald Trump 
campaigned on the promise that the treaty would be renegotiated to better reflect what he 
characterized as an unequal relationship with Canada and Mexico in which Americans acted 
essentially as the middleman by which the rest of North America was economically dependent.35 
On his first day in office, President Trump signed an executive order officially beginning 
NAFTA’s renegotiation, threatening the other two countries with an American exit of the trade 
bloc should negotiations not be held.36 Sources from inside the Trump White House even 
contend that a draft executive order was prepared “such that, if signed by the President, the US 
would withdraw from NAFTA in six months.”37 Throughout negotiations, President Trump 
repeatedly and publicly claimed that renegotiation efforts were worthless and a new agreement 
would be unlikely to come to fruition, in addition to declarations from US Trade Representatives 
that, should the negotiations fail, the United States would immediately dissolve the bloc and 
instead maintain free trade relations with Mexico and Canada at an individual level.38 Even with 
serious concerns over its implementation, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), 
otherwise referred to as “NAFTA 2.0” or “New NAFTA,” was officially signed into law in the 
United States on January 27, 2020, though it does not represent any serious improvement from 
its predecessor.39 
                                                          
34 “NAFTA: ‘Single Worst Deal Ever Approved.” BBC News. 27 September 2016. 
35 Wagner, Meg & Brian Ries. “Trump Gives Remarks on US-Mexico-Canada Deal.” CNN. 1 October 2018. 
36 Parilla, Joseph. “US NAFTA Renegotiations.” Brookings. 19 September 2017. 
37 Abboushi, Suhail. “The Challenge of Renegotiating NAFTA.” Competition Forum, Jan 2018: 16 (1). Pg. 56. 
38 Abboushi, pg. 56. 
39 Elis, Niv. “First USMCA Report Raises ‘Serious Concerns’ on Mexico Labor Law Implementation.” The Hill. 17 
December 2020. 
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 The baseline theory behind NAFTA was that it would allow each of the three 
participating countries to use their economic strengths in order to make up for the economic 
weaknesses of the other – in particular, it facilitated “the creation of suitable conditions for the 
realization of profits by US financial institutions and manufacturers through carefully regulated 
investment in Mexico.”40 It is based in a broader understanding of free trade as the instrument of 
comparative advantage, in which “each country will specialize in the activity in which it has 
[the] advantage” and, “since each country is specializing in a particular area or product, each … 
should mutually benefit from the agreement and generate more overall income.”41 This would be 
done primarily by the elimination and standardization of tariffs, the decreased use of subsidies, 
and the expansion of North American markets with a hope that Mexico would be granted the 
opportunity to make more productive use of its labor abundance from which the US and Canada 
would benefit.42 It places significant emphasis on the preservation of foreign capital mobility 
through strong protections of intellectual property, expanding investments in 
telecommunications, banking, biotechnology, and computer technology, while at the same time 
creating virtually “free access” to Mexican workers, “thereby enabling a new international 
division of labor.”43 At its outset, it was larger “in territory, population, and product” than the 
first fifteen members of the European Union combined, and was heralded around the globe as the 
first regional trade bloc put into force between countries in different stages of development.44 
                                                          
Swanson, Ana & Jim Tankersley. “Trump Just Signed the USMCA. Here’s What’s in the New NAFTA.” The New 
York Times. 29 January 2020. 
40 Fernández-Kelly Patricia & Douglas S. Massey. “Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-US 
Migration.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2007: 610. Pg. 115. 
41 Hing, Bill Ong. Ethical Borders: NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migration. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2010. Pg. 10. 
42 Hartman, Stephen W. “NAFTA, the Controversy.” The International Trade Journal, Jan 2011: 25 (1). Pg. 4. 
García Zamora, Rodolfo. “Crisis, NAFTA, and International Migration: From Massive Migration to Growing 
Repatriation.” International Journal of Political Economy, Summer 2014: 43 (2). Pg. 29. 
43 Fernández-Kelly & Massey, pg. 103. 
44 Hing, pg. 11. 
De Jesus 12 
 
 Formal NAFTA negotiations would begin only after the signing of the Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1988 under the Reagan administration. Driven by a general belief 
that the American economy was in decline, the United States entered into talks with Mexico 
under the Bush (Sr.) administration after being approached by Mexican President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari.45 The two governments justified the landmark agreement in three basic ways: job 
creation in the United States, which would then raise the American standard of living; economic 
development in Mexico, which would then curb undocumented migration to the US; and 
democratic alimentation within the Mexican government, which by then had been under the 
governance of a single political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), for more 
than 60 years.46 They contended that “trade liberalization” through Mexican economic 
development and investment “would lead to economic convergence between the two countries” 
based squarely in neoliberal market-oriented principles.47 On the American side, Bush weighed 
fears of job loss and outsourcing with promises of huge reductions in the population of 
undocumented peoples living in the US; on the Mexican, Salinas weighed fears of American and 
Canadian market domination with promises that production loss would be counteracted by the 
rapid growth of the maquiladora sector on the northern border.48 In this, one can begin to further 
analyze the US-Mexico relationship represented in NAFTA as it pertains specifically to 
migration using Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas’ conceptualization of migration 
diplomacy. 
 Migration diplomacy refers to “states’ use of diplomatic tools, processes, and 
procedures” to manage migratory flows, a strategy which, as they note, is used often when 
                                                          
45 Kresl, Peter Karl. “NAFTA and Its Discontents.” International Journal, Spring 2005: 60 (2). Pg. 418. 
46 Hing, pg. 22. 
47 Hing, pg. 30, 34. 
48 Kresl, pg. 421. 
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countries with less power are attempting to strengthen their bargaining position against more 
powerful ones.49 Within this framework, states’ positions are based in their relationship to 
migratory patterns – whether they are primarily concerned with immigration (migrant-receiving), 
emigration (migrant-sending), or transit migration (transit states) determines their point of 
leverage.50 In the case of NAFTA, the United States acts as the receiving country, using the trade 
deal in order to indirectly address one of its primary concerns: undocumented immigration. 
Mexico leverages its position as a migrant-sending country in order to achieve greater policy 
goals: as a sending country, it not only has an abundance of human capital that it can mobilize 
for, hypothetically, labor negotiations (such as in the case of a cross-border work program like 
the Bracero Program), but also an added threat to the migrant-receiving nations of the US and 
Canada, who are largely concerned with keeping these migrants out. As Adamson and Tsourapas 
write, “migration diplomacy can include both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to 
obtain other aims or the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration.”51 The 
US is clearly attempting to achieve the latter, while Mexico is attempting both; it is using its 
position as a migrant-sending country at face value while also, at the same time, attempting to 
use NAFTA as a method of development in order to curb capital flight. NAFTA, in fact, as it 
was conceptualized only works between countries of different statuses because it is largely 
dependent on Mexico’s semi-informal, semi-industrial economy to bend toward American and 
Canadian insistence. 
                                                          
49 Adamson, Fiona B. & Gerasimos Tsourapas. “Migration Diplomacy in World Politics.” International Studies 
Perspectives, May 2019: 20 (2). Pg. 115. 
Adamson & Tsourapas (2019), pg. 118. 
50 Adamson & Tsourapas (2019), pg. 118. 
51 Adamson & Tsourapas (2019), pg. 116. 
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It is for this reason NAFTA is understood as a failure, at least where it concerns Mexico 
and, to a lesser extent, the United States. North American economic convergence has never been 
achieved – Mexico’s GDP per capita has, in reality, fallen in comparison to the US, which has 
remained fairly unaffected overall, and Canada, which has seen great success under the 
agreement – and Mexico has not seen the great economic or political transformation it was once 
promised.52 (While it would transition to democracy in 2000, this can be argued as a result of 
anti-NAFTA sentiments against the PRI.) For these reasons, migration to the US actually almost 
immediately began to increase after the treaty entered into effect on January 1, 1994, with three 
specific root causes: the diminished returns of foreign factory investment, the decimation of 
Mexican agriculture, and the 1994 peso crisis. 
 
The Maquiladoras 
 While it is true that Mexican imports did improve with NAFTA, increasing at an annual 
rate of 9.96 percent from 1993 to 2013, it is unclear whether this is a direct result of the free 
trade bloc or of measures taken independently by the Mexican government.53 Though President 
Salinas argued that NAFTA would “create the institutional conditions for the full employment of 
productive resources and … the capability to create higher-productivity jobs,” it almost 
immediately ended up doing the exact opposite.54 Much of Mexico’s planned transformation was 
actually dependent on the expansion of the manufacturing sector to facilitate export-oriented 
growth, as well as supplement job loss in other sectors of the economy beat out by American and 
Canadian competition. Previous decades had seen success with the expansion of the maquiladora 
                                                          
52 García Zamora, pg. 34. 
53 Ramírez Sánchez, José Carlos, Cuauhtémoc Calderón & Sarahí Sánchez León. “Is NAFTA Really Advantageous 
for Mexico?” The International Trade Journal, 2018: 32 (1). Pg. 23. 
54 García Zamora, pg. 29. 
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industry – which are Mexican manufacturing companies, as approved by the Secretariat of 
Commerce and Industrial Development, which incentivize foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
operating tariff- and duty-free – and it represented a significant lure for the United States and 
Canada during NAFTA negotiations.55  
This incentive, once thought vital to Mexico’s participation in the trade bloc, would go on 
to be undercut by foreign corporate interests and, later, abandoned. Electronics components 
imported duty-free from Asia, once processed and made into their final products, qualified under 
NAFTA to be exported duty-free to the United States and Canada, beating out dutiable Asian 
products. Under the treaty, however, Mexico was forced to give up the “maquiladora advantage” 
by January of 2001.56 Additionally, under the agreement “governments could no longer require 
foreign investors to purchase supplies from domestic businesses,” allowing corporations like 
Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors to funnel parts from their own subsidiaries into Mexican 
automobile factories and causing parts workers in Mexico to “[lose] their jobs by the 
thousands.”57 Though around 800,000 jobs were added to the maquiladora economy between 
1994 and 2001, approximately 125,000 of those jobs had been eliminated by 2006; according to 
Robert A. Blecker, total manufacturing employment reached a peak of 4.1 million in 2000 before 
dropping by hundreds of thousands to 3.5 million just a few years later despite the massive influx 
of foreign-owned factories.58 David Bacon paints a more dire portrait, writing that “recession in 
                                                          
55 Sklair, Leslie. Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United States. London & 
New York: Routledge, 1989. Pg. 10. 
56 Hing, pg. 18. 
57 Hing, pg. 25. 
Bacon, David. Illegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration and Criminalizes Immigrants. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2008. Pg. 64. 
58 Hing, pg. 18. 
Hing pg. 9. 
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the United States [in 2001], and the decline in consumer purchasing, led to the layoff of over 
four hundred thousand workers in the maquiladoras.”59  
This loss has only been accelerated by the rise of China as an international manufacturing 
hub. As Stephen Hartman writes in 2011, “about 30 percent of the jobs that were created in 
maquiladoras … in the 1990s have since disappeared,” with, according to Peter Kresl, “one-
third” of maquiladoras being relocated to lower-wage factory operations in Asia, and in 
particular, China.60 At peak maquiladora operation from 2000-2001, wages were “less than 10 
percent of manufacturing wages in the United States” – part of Mexico’s low-wage incentive 
strategy. Between 2002 and 2003, hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs would be 
relocated to China, “where wages were [just] 3 percent” of those in the US.61 China surpassed 
Mexico in 2003 as the US’s second largest source of imports after Canada, increasing from a 
value of $27.4 billion in 1992 to $106.2 billion in 2000.62 Conditions worsened when, in January 
of 2005, international limits on clothing exports expired, giving Chinese production another 
product sector to gain the advantage over.63 Mexico’s proximity advantage has also largely been 
nullified by the uptick in rapid international shipping.64 Today, while Mexico has re-advanced to 
become the second largest source of imports, China has since accelerated to number one, with 
Mexican goods representing $325.4 trillion in US imports in 2020 versus China’s $435.4 
trillion.65 Though the decline of the manufacturing sector would have harmed the Mexican 
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 Even if everything with NAFTA had gone perfectly, the agricultural sector in Mexico 
still would have taken a significant hit. It had come into negotiations already with a trade deficit 
with the United States – something that would only worsen after the agreement went into force – 
and a massive productivity disparity in farming in comparison to the US and Canada.66 
According to García Zamora, only 15 percent of farmers were operating at a production level 
capable of competing under NAFTA’s new framework of trade liberalization, with another 35 
percent dependent on preexisting government programs and the latter 50 percent considered to 
have no productive potential under this framework.67 The Mexican government had previously 
supported farmers through agricultural subsidies and price reductions for consumers through the 
Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO), a state-run corporation created 
to motivate food distribution and curb rural hunger. Mexican subsidies, which many growers 
previously depended on, were ruled illegal under the agreement while American subsides were 
allowed to remain.68 Laura Carlsen, Director of the Americas program at the Center for 
International Policy in Mexico City, argues not only that the decline of traditional agriculture 
was an unfortunate possibility, but was actually planned from the start. As Bill Hing writes, corn 
farmland that could not productively compete would be converted for other uses “even though 
[it] constituted half of national production, and half of that land produced for family 
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consumption.” FDI in agriculture, a key part of NAFTA strategy, represented only 0.1 percent of 
total investment in Mexico and, by 2004, it had decreased to 0.09 percent.69  
In reality, whether planned or not, the Mexican government could not have prepared for 
the destruction NAFTA would cause on the agricultural sector. The agreement did not provide 
any sort of transition period for phasing out agricultural tariffs, crop substitution assistance, or 
employment restructuring for predictable rural job loss.70 When customs barriers came down, 
corporations flooded Mexican markets with foreign grain, produce, and, in particular, corn, 
forcing Mexican producers out of business and, in turn, plunging the country’s large population 
of subsistence farmers into poverty and starvation. CONASUPO was now meant to compete with 
private foreign corporations.71 People in the country could no longer afford to live – only a 
comparatively small portion of agriculture in Mexico was mechanized, meaning that the majority 
of corn farmers could not outcompete American imports produced with ample subsidies, better 
technology, and larger economies of scale.72 Employment in the agricultural sector decreased 
from 8.1 million at the end of 1993 to 6.8 million by the end of 2004, with over a million jobs 
lost among corn producers alone.73 People in the cities faced skyrocketing prices of basic goods 
with the end of CONASUPO; in the few years after NAFTA was officially put into force, the 
price of tortillas rise by “more than 380 percent.”74 Poverty rates, especially in the poorest states 
of Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Michoacán, began to rise rapidly.75 Around the same time, a global 
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coffee surplus would drop prices so low that they failed to exceed the cost of production.76 By 
the time Mexico transitioned to democracy with the 2000 inauguration of Vicente Fox, the 
government had been trying to appeal for “compensatory financing for restructuring,” which 
went ignored by the US and Canada.77 Collectively, the fusion of an immediate agricultural crisis 
with a gradually worsening manufacturing crisis would be exacerbated by a much larger, 
economy-wide financial crisis, the worst in Mexican history. 
 
The Peso Crisis 
 With its series of privatization and stabilization efforts in the 1980s considered 
successful, the early 1990s saw foreign capitalist classes eager to invest in a rapidly developing 
Mexico. As Nora Lustig writes, “between 1989 and 1993, the saving-investment gap grew by 
seven percentage points (as a proportion of GDP),” meaning that, while more foreigners were 
investing, more Mexican people were also spending, thereby stimulating the economy.78 Though 
this economic project had been in the works generally for at least the past two decades, the 
government of Mexico attracted capital interest through two “highly visible means” in the far 
late 1980s, one being mass privatization, and the other being the announcement of negotiations 
toward a free trade agreement with the United States.79 NAFTA, as was its intention even before 
officially coming into existence, played an integral part in bringing this early investment into 
Mexico, as efforts to liberalize the economy were also, in part, meant to act as precursors to the 
agreement itself. This perfectly coincided with American and Canadian interests; the idea was 
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simple: the easier it was for foreign corporations to invest and operate in Mexico, the more they 
would want to do so, banking on downward harmonization of labor standards and proximity 
advantage. NAFTA, as it turns out, in combination with previous efforts, created what Jeff Faux 
of the Economic Policy Institute would call a “speculative bubble for Mexican assets,” that could 
only prove deadly for the long-term growth of the Mexican economy (as well as connected 
economies of other Latin American countries).80 
 On January 1 of 1994, the day NAFTA would go into effect, a collection of indigenous 
Maya peoples known as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) published their 
“First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle” in Chiapas, the poorest and most southward state 
in Mexico. In it, they declared war on the Mexican state and lambasted its government as nothing 
more than an illegitimate, dictatorial one-party system with President Salinas at the head.81 
Under the name of indigenous revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata, they defined themselves as a 
socialist, anti-colonialist, anti-globalist force seeking to disrupt and dismantle the state and, with 
it, NAFTA. They were championed by a mysterious, well-spoken masked leader who called 
himself Subcomandante Marcos and made good use of the internet, still in its infancy, to spread 
their message. Seventeen days after their first declaration, in response to offers of amnesty in 
exchange for a ceasefire, they published a scathing letter asking “¿Quién tiene que pedir perdón 
y quién puede otorgarlo?” – “Who must ask for forgiveness and who can grant it?”82 Everyday 
people around the world were captivated by the struggle of the indigenous campesino, but 
investors were not. Just two months later, on March 23, President of the PRI and leading 
presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated in broad daylight at a political 
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rally in Tijuana.83 In just those few months, much of the economic goodwill cultivated by the 
Mexican government was lost. 
Between March 23 and April 21 alone, foreign exchange reserves fell by almost US$11 
billion.84 In response, in December the Mexican government expanded domestic credit lines and 
devalued the peso to almost half of its original value in an attempt to prevent further capital 
flight northward. This would only further encourage foreign investors to sell back their bonds, 
fearful of a wave of political and economic instability.85 NAFTA, a deal which, in part, was 
meant to facilitate and ensure the economic stability of Mexico, not only did not prevent the 
crisis, but “actually represented an obstacle to ameliorating some of [its] consequences.”86 While 
extremely technically encouraging of FDI, the treaty also strongly limited the ability of Mexico 
to control capital flowing in or, more importantly, out of the country. As easy as it was to invest, 
corporations could just as easily take their money elsewhere once it became clear that Mexico 
was not as stable as they had supposedly been led to believe.87 The effects of these decisions tore 
through the country, intensifying an already-mounting agricultural crisis and, in some ways, 
helping bring about the much slower downfall of the manufacturing sector.  
As David Bacon states, “Mexico lost a million jobs, by the government’s own count, in 
1995,” leading the nation into a period of economic stagnation that would only further deter 
globalizing efforts.88 Income inequality, which had been gradually declining, skyrocketed under 
NAFTA, with “the top 10 percent of households [increasing] their share of national income, 
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while the other 90 percent have lost income share or seen no change.”89 On wage decreases, 
Hing writes in 2010: 
“In 1975, Mexican wages were about 23 percent of U.S. wages; just before NAFTA was 
implemented in 1994, they declined to 15 percent; by 2003, they had dropped further, to 
12 percent of U.S. wages. Wages for manufacturing workers (both maquiladora and non-
maquiladora) fell below pre-NAFTA levels. Even highly educated workers … had lower 
wages in the late 1990s than in 1993. So the average Mexican worker’s wages and 
standard of living has not improved…”90 
In fact, in 2011 Hartman cites the CIA’s World Factbook Mexico as stating that “per capita 
income is one-fourth that of the US.”91 In 2018, according to the World Bank, adjusted net 
national income per capita for Mexico (US$7,447) represented just under 14 percent of that of 
the United States (US$53,497).92 With disaster pressing at every level of the economy – one that, 
as established, would not be mitigated – and a continued push for industrial output to keep up the 
export market, a “new phenomenon” began to emerge under NAFTA, a sort of “high-
productivity poverty.”93 As working conditions only worsened, basic goods became more 
expensive, and the currency exchange rate only continued to diverge, people in Mexico 
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Migration and the Liberal Paradox 
 In addition to causing the economic disparity that would spur more people to migrate 
from Mexico, NAFTA as it is written completely shuts out any discussion of free movement. 
Unlike the European Union – the other big free trade agreement of the 1990s – labor mobility 
was left utterly ignored in US-Mexico-Canada negotiations. As Patricia Fernández-Kelly and 
Douglas Massey argue, the harmonization of labor mobility and workers’ rights had been one of 
the reasons why European market consolidation was so successful at the outset, whereas, in the 
case of NAFTA, backers “instead insisted on the unilateral right to prevent Mexican workers 
from migrating.”94 President Salinas, in commenting on the purpose of NAFTA to create jobs in 
Mexico, asserted that “the whole point … is to be able to export goods and not people.”95 
Though, in addition to unfavorable economic conditions that would encourage migration, the 
functioning of the treaty itself in some ways may have actually made it easier to migrate. 
Expanding webs of transportation and communication, “which facilitate commercial 
transactions, also [makes] the movement of individuals easier and cheaper.”96 Increased 
movement fosters a greater amount of social linkages between citizens of the two countries, 
making it easier for migrants to travel and reside. Among other scholars, Massey has criticized 
the lack of preparedness for increased migration as “a shortsighted understanding of how 
NAFTA would work,” arguing that it should have been anticipated from the very beginning.97 
Kevin Johnson argues that it is intentional, writing that “the debate over NAFTA ‘did not view 
the trade agreement and immigration as related,’” and that the US chose to purposefully exclude 
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labor migration from the negotiation table.98 When the US was urged to reject the agreement late 
in negotiation if Mexico did not officially agree to limit migration flows, the Mexican 
government argued that American stakeholders were advocating for a violation of their citizens’ 
right to travel. Officially, the Americans stated that it was “too late to add provisions on 
immigration controls.”99 
 Here, one can see the dangerously ironic conditions under which NAFTA was produced, 
as there remains an intrinsically close relationship between American trade and immigration 
policy.100 Juan Manuel Sandoval, a Mexican politician from the opposition Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN), attests that “Mexican labor has always been linked to the different stages of US 
development since the nineteenth century.”101 David Bacon characterizes post-NAFTA 
emigration as almost inevitable, not merely because of its adverse effects but because of the 
nature of global trade itself. “In the global economy,” he writes, “people are displaced because 
the economies of their countries of origin are transformed, to enable corporations and national 
entities to transfer wealth out.”102 International trade creates an inherent inequality within 
developing countries in which import- and export-oriented economic sectors are located in 
different parts of the country, such as the case of Mexican agricultural contraction being 
sacrificed for the expansion of manufacturing in Northern border-zones.103 This inequality is 
twofold: the American industries which, due to more competitive subsidization and 
mechanization, beat out Mexican ones maintain their level of production due to, in large part, 
undocumented Mexican labor. Capitalism favors borders that are as porous as possible, but labor 
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“must arrive in a vulnerable, second-class status.”104 So, while the reduction of immigration was 
the stated goal of American participation in NAFTA, it has also benefited from undocumented 
migrants seeking, more than anything, to work. Mexico seems to have, as well, with President 
Vicente Fox bragging in 2005 that Mexicans in the US had sent back $18 billion worth of 
remittances.105 
 James Hollified conceptualizes this irony as a sort of liberal paradox. With the rise of 
international systems of trade, investment, and migration, states are demanded to remain open in 
order to reap the benefits of economic interconnectedness. At the same time, transnationalism, 
especially in the form of migration, may violate the territorial restriction inherent to the accepted 
principles of state sovereignty. The urge is openness, but the natural inclination is closure.106 
From this paradox, he contends that trade and migration are “two sides of the same coin,” 
arguing that the rise of international economics has also facilitated the rise of the migration state, 
in which “considerations of power … are driven as much by migration as they are by commerce 
and finance.”107 As migration flows increase, “states are forced to respond by developing new 
policies to cope with newcomers … or deal with an exodus and potential return.”108 The United 
States had only even taken up President Salinas’ calls to begin negotiations after the Commission 
for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, created under 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), concluded that “US economic policy 
should promote a system of open trade” in order to curb economic migration from the south.109 
Curbing the flow of migrants – especially the mostly-brown, mostly-undocumented ones coming 
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through its southern border – was an imperative motivation for creating a trade bloc with 
Mexico. In the thirteen years after NAFTA, more than 6 million people came to live in the 
United States, more than “almost any other period in our history.”110 The landmark agreement 
had officially failed at performing its unassailable but unspoken central purpose. In the scope of 
migration diplomacy, while Mexico had effectively lost its central bargaining chip, the United 
States had also lost, as well. Mexican negotiators bargained with the promise that development 
would largely end migration northward, failing to prevent migration and also losing out on 
decades of development efforts. The US (and Canada, to some extent) had entered into 
negotiations attempting to have its cake and eat it, too, using its status as an economic 
powerhouse while also preventing Mexico from gaining any of the market share in agriculture or 
manufacturing that would have actually produced positive results. In doing so, NAFTA caused 
its own fundamental problem, and the United States, instead of answering to Mexican calls for a 
reassessment of the agreement or an allowance of foreign relief, responded by making it much 
harder to migrate. 
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The American Response 
 Quoting the Copenhagen School, Hugh Hutchison identifies the process of securitization 
as one cut into two subsequent parts. The first is the “speech act,” in which officials direct public 
attention to an issue, “real or perceived, [that represents] an existential threat to the state.”111 The 
second is response, defined by the public policy decisions taken up to address the stated issue. 
He notes that securitization is not a natural process, but a process which artificially shifts a 
particular policy issue into an area in which policymakers may then “use the means necessary to 
block [its] development.”112 He also argues that it is an inherently performative process; the 
“securitizing actor” must be able to “adequately elevate a particular issue … in the eyes of its 
audience.”113 With this set out, he argues (writing in 2020) that the securitization of migration is 
a “relatively new phenomenon,” developed first with the growth of Europeanization in 
conjunction with the worsening Syrian migrant crisis in the European Union. In North America, 
he identifies – wrongly so, as this paper argues – the aftermath of 9/11 as its origin, born out of 
the conflation of migration and the newly-established concept of “homeland security.”114 While 
it is true that, after 9/11, American fears of international terrorism may have sent migrant 
securitization in a particular policy direction, the concept itself predates this period. 
NAFTA, as the intended tool of migration prevention, coincided with a wave of punitive 
efforts that would only grow in severity as the number of migrants seeking entry grew with rising 
crises in Mexico. This wave of policy decisions builds upon the passage of the IRCA in 1986 – 
the legislation that created the body that would come to recommend NAFTA as a method of 
migration control – which made the hiring of undocumented laborers illegal and expanded 
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funding to US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for Border Patrol programs, 
training, and enforcement by 50 percent.115 Though this is at least two years before trade 
negotiations would even become a possibility between the Bush (Sr.) and Salinas 
administrations, the IRCA marks a moment in which immigration policy on the US-Mexico 
border shifted into a more openly repressive tenor. Even with this, however, the law also 
createed two different paths to legal residency: one for undocumented people who have been 
living in the United States since 1982, the other for certain agricultural workers who have been 
living and working in the US for at least 90 days.116 The Immigration Act of 1990 (passed while 
the US and Mexico were still in the beginning stages of NAFTA negotiations) continued this 
tone of repression while still maintaining reasonable policy expansions. On one hand, it 
expanded the legal understanding of aggravated felony to include “nonpolitical crimes of 
violence for which a prison sentence of at least five years was imposed” while also eliminating 
relief from removal for certain convicted felons and judicial recommendations against 
deportation. On the other, it raised legal admissions above pre-IRCA levels, relaxed controls on 
migrant workers, and limited the ability of the government to deport for ideological reasons.117 
Even with repressive efforts, there is still a sense of balance in policymaking at the border; it is 
not until NAFTA comes into existence that the tone shifts further into one that seeks to securitize 
the border and criminalize those crossing it. 
 By the final months of 1993, NAFTA had been signed off by all three participating 
countries and was in the process of being ratified by each of their legislatures. American 
President Bill Clinton, having been in office for less than a year, had been elected on the promise 
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of a tougher stance on immigration. As such, on September 19, 1993, Border Patrol officials 
launched what they called “Operation Blockade,” a near-total blockage of the 20-mile border-
zone along the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez sector, the region with the largest binational labor force in 
the Americas and the second-largest number of crossings annually in the US-Mexico border-
zone.118 Border Patrol agents had up until then focused mainly on arresting undocumented 
migrants as they crossed, for the most part leaving the border porous and passing up those who 
had already crossed successfully. Silvestre Reyes, Chief Patrol Agent of the El Paso sector at the 
time, had attested to INS’s direct approval of the blockade and, even with a potential cut of the 
$250,000 in overtime the operation had cost, affirmed that he had planned for it to continue 
indefinitely under the name “Operation Hold the Line.” When asked, many American residents 
of the sector pointed directly to their fears of NAFTA and the potential job loss it may cause 
once Mexican labor became more accessible.119  
 On October 1, 1994, exactly nine months to the day NAFTA had gone into effect, 
Clinton’s Border Patrol launched its follow-up to Operation Blockade, codenamed “Operation 
Gatekeeper,” in the San Diego-Tijuana sector, the region with the largest number of border 
crossings annually.120 Though similar in action to previous border blockages, taking Gatekeeper 
in tandem with the continuation of Blockade as Hold the Line, one can see that INS was 
beginning to form a comprehensive policy direction out of these individual decisions. Indeed, 
Gatekeeper officially marks the beginning of “prevention through deterrence,” a strategy that the 
DHS still prioritizes to this day.121 As described by Ines Michalowski, the strategy involves the 
closure, blockage, or impediment of certain border crossing zones in order to “force migrants 
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away from safer routes and toward dangerous ones,” which, according to this strategy, should 
deter people from attempting to cross.122 This illusion of choice allows immigration officials to 
put the liability of migration on the individual, which allows them to claim plausible institutional 
deniability. As such, according to Ahn et al. the official annual death count at the US-Mexico 
border increased by “600 percent” from 24 in 1994 to 147 by 1998.123 This highlights yet another 
advantage of “prevention through deterrence” – funneling migrants into crossing zones that are 
more geographically remote (the primary reason why they are so dangerous) means that official 
death counts are more likely than not dramatically understated. As a response to the rapid rise in 
crossings post-NAFTA, Gatekeeper’s shift in official policy orientation also coincides with a rise 
of a “new system of organized crime and human smuggling” that sought to take advantage of 
Mexico’s economic depression and migrants’ desperation.124 
 Domestically, post-NAFTA migration also inspired a wave of anti-immigration 
legislation. In California in 1994, many legislators supported Proposition 187 (otherwise known 
as the “Save Our State” Initiative), which, if it had passed, would have established a California 
state citizenship screening system and denied medical care and public education to 
undocumented people.125 The same year, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
granted the Attorney General the ability to bypass deportation proceedings, increased penalties 
for post-deportation reentry, and expanded Border Patrol funding. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act established the procedure for the expedited removal of individuals 
suspected of having entered the country without documentation and expanded the definition of 
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aggravated felony. Later the same year, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act further expanded the definition of aggravated felony as well as the legal 
grounds of deportability, further defined expedited removal, bolstered mandatory detention, 
increased the number of border agents, reduced public benefits for immigrants, increased 
penalties for undocumented peoples, and strengthened requirements for asylum seekers.126 The 
post-9/11 era would see the infamous Patriot Act in 2001, which broadened grounds for denying 
entry, and the Homeland Security Act in 2002, which dismantled INS and stripped the 
Department of Justice of its migration duties, transferring them to the newly-created Department 
of Homeland Security.127 In 2005, the REAL ID Act established guidelines for removal, 
expanded terrorism grounds for denial of entry and deportation, and required state governments 
to verify an individual’s legal status before granting a federally-accepted ID.128 Later in the year, 
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner convinced all of his Republican colleagues – as well as 35 
Democrats – in the House of Representatives to vote in favor of HR 4437, known as the Border 
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, which would have made 
unauthorized border crossing a federal felony (and, retroactively, would have made all 12 million 
of the undocumented people living in the US felons), in addition to making the aid or 
employment of an undocumented migrant a felony.129 Though it never passed in the Senate, 
Congress responded instead by passing the Secure Fence Act in 2006, which “mandates the 
construction of more than 700 miles of double-reinforced fence” along the US-Mexico border, 
increases the number of border checkpoints, and requires the modernization of CBP 
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equipment.130 So, while legislators and border officials attempted to securitize the border – 
which is to say that they have begun to approach border policy as an extension of national 
security – official strategy was reflected in the internal policing of immigrants, who then began 
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The Mexican Response 
 To return to Adamson and Tsourapas’ conceptualization of migration diplomacy, in the 
post-NAFTA era, the United States and Mexico conducted themselves very differently from how 
they may have acted in the past. Mexico, for one, had quickly devolved from being a hopeful and 
tentatively dependable developing nation to a regressive, politically unstable drug den in the eyes 
of US policymakers. With NAFTA, Mexico had bet on its economy using migration control as 
the tool; if they wanted undocumented Mexicans to stop coming to the US, then they would have 
to create the conditions in which people no longer felt the need to migrate. This exchange had 
been framed as a positive-sum game, one in which, despite potential inequalities, all participants 
(including Canada) would benefit. In reality, the US and Canada had always approached it as a 
zero-sum situation: in order for them to maintain their strategic advantages over certain 
industries, under free trade conditions they would have to topple over Mexican industries which, 
under normal conditions, would have had the advantage. Because of this, Mexico had to change 
its migration strategy. Instead of approaching migration and development as an issue of 
economic control, they began to prioritize both subjects as pieces of a larger security agenda. To 
understand this shift, one must first understand the larger context of Mexican development 
strategy and how it relates to migration, first through the lens of Adamson and Tsourapas’ 
criticism of Hollifield’s migration state. 
 A central critique of the field of migration studies in general, but particularly of 
Hollifield, is that it often deliberately ignores or downplays the role of developing states in the 
Global South as active agents in the grand scope of international migration. In his own words, 
Hollifield writes plainly that, 
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“With very few exceptions … [less-developed countries] have not evolved elaborate laws 
or policies for governing migration. Wealthier Third World states have put in place 
contract or guest worker schemes, negotiated with the sending countries and with no 
provisions for settlement or family re-unification. … More often than not, the sending 
countries are unwilling to provoke a conflict with a receiving state over individual cases 
of abuse for fear of losing access to remittances, which are one of the largest sources of 
foreign exchange for many [developing countries].”131  
In “The Migration State in the Global South,” Adamson and Tsourapas present a direct challenge 
to this oversimplification of the developing world by countering his centering of the liberal 
paradox. They argue that his framework of the migration state – which prioritizes the tradeoff 
between openness and closure associated with voluntary economic migration – is biased not only 
in favor of already-developed neoliberal economies, but also of traditional Westphalian 
democracies.132 As such, they present an alternative model, that of the “illiberal paradox” when it 
comes to migration policy: “on the one hand, [states] seek to restrict emigration for political and 
security reasons; on the other hand, they need to encourage emigration for economic reasons,” 
like remittance income, underemployment, or overpopulation.”133 From this paradox, they 
extract three new ideal models of the migration state: the nationalizing migration state (focused 
on forced expulsion and population exchange), the developmental migration state (focused on 
the use of strategic labor emigration), and the neoliberal migration state (focused on the 
commodification of migrants).134 For the developmental model in particular, Adamson and 
Tsourapas use Mexico, the Bracero Program, and the Tres por Uno (3×1) Program as a key 
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example.135 While accurate, this does not fully encapsulate the ways in which Mexico has fully 
utilized migration as the conduit of development (especially as it relates to NAFTA, a key 
turning point), or how this development scheme has actually affected Mexico internally. 
 
Mexican Development 
 As they correctly state, Mexico began its grand development strategy in 1942 with the 
inauguration of the Bracero Program. Under the program, the Mexican government would send 
agricultural laborers to the United States in exchange for limited remittances and “modernizing 
influences.”136 Formed under the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement, the program would end in 
1964 after it became clear that labor needs in the US could be fulfilled without the direct 
collaboration of the Mexican state through undocumented migration. They further cite the Tres 
por Uno Program, instituted in 2002, which promised to match remittance values three-to-one to 
“encourage emigrant investment in local development schemes.”137 Together, they form 
Adamson and Tsourapas’ ideal developmental migration state, one in which development is 
based on the exportation of migrants in order to collect their wages in the form of remittances, 
acting both as a valuable source of foreign exchange and a supplement for money that would 
otherwise be spent on public programs.138 Yet, while Mexico can and, as argued here, should fit 
the developmental model, remittance dependence is not necessarily why. First and foremost, 
while remittances make up a large portion of the Mexican economy (an estimated 3.9% in 2020, 
according to the World Bank) to say that Mexican development – and further, migration strategy 
– is totally reliant on remittance income oversimplifies Mexican policymaking and Mexico’s 
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status as both a sending and transit state.139 In addition, to say that the Mexican government 
“continued to encourage emigration as an ‘economic escape valve’” is technically true, but not 
entirely representative of the actual attitude of the state when it came to mass migration 
northward.140 
As Bill Hing writes, though “economists sometimes view remittances as the silver lining 
to the immigration cloud … they are no substitute for real development policy,” which is 
something that the Mexican government realized once it became clear that the United States 
would not return to the Bracero status quo.141 Additionally, one of Mexico’s first major internal 
steps toward modernized economic development began in the era post-World War II when the 
government took up the strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Based largely in 
nationalist sentiments left over from the Mexican Revolution (roughly 1910-1924), the general 
method behind ISI was to create or bolster enterprises which domestically produce goods that 
would otherwise be imported in. It was a development scheme famously taken up by plenty of 
countries throughout the Global South, but was especially popular in Latin America. Mexico, 
along with Argentina and Brazil, would see much of the greatest success – for a while, the use of 
the ISI strategy expanded industry, provided much-needed jobs, and improved the domestic 
market for goods and services. In combination with the revenue from remittances, ISI allowed 
businesses to thrive and provided security to both agricultural and industrial workers who had 
not emigrated under the Bracero work agreement. Capitalism blossomed, though it was 
noticeably regulated and excluded opportunities for FDI outside of its relationship with the 
United States.142 This period of success would come to be known as the “Mexican miracle,” 
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though the ISI bubble would start to deflate in the 1960s and fully collapse in the 1970s as oil 
discoveries gradually created a severe peso overvaluation, further causing non-oil exports to 
suffer.  
The end of the Bracero Program and steady decline of ISI left many braceros out of work, 
representing a potential stall to an already-fragile economy. In 1965, a year after the Bracero 
Program officially came to an end, the government began the Border Industrial Program in order 
to create jobs for former emigrant workers and attract FDI into the region that, at the time, 
represented one of Mexico’s least developed, the northern border-zone. It not only succeeded, 
but it actually began to encourage industrial development and integration into the global 
economy, unlike Bracero or ISI. Many workers migrated from the country’s interior to the 
border-zone to work in the maquiladoras or otherwise end up in Mexico’s northeastern 
mechanized agricultural industry. It specifically incentivized young women (because of cultural 
perceptions of women as more hardworking and trustworthy) to work on the factory lines, 
mobilizing a previously underutilized sector of the labor force. Over time, the maquiladora 
industry grew to become the largest industry “on the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border.”143 
While it is certainly not perfect – it prioritizes access to the American economy, for example, 
which in turn makes Mexico more vulnerable to foreign economic crises – it bore the brunt of 
the early work when it comes both development and migration strategy in Mexico. In the 1980s, 
even while the rest of the country’s economy struggled under the weight of a post-oil crisis 
economic depression known as the Lost Decade, the maquiladoras expanded. Between the years 
of 1982 and 1988, the number of maquiladoras on the northern border with the United States 
tripled from 500 to 1,500, with the number of employees more than doubling from 150,000 to 
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360,000. During this period, the maquiladoras would produce up to 40 percent of Mexico’s total 
exports.144 By the beginning of the 1990s, these factories would represent the second-largest 
source of foreign currency in the entire economy as well as 45 percent of Mexico’s exports. In 
addition, the expansion of the industrial sector encouraged technology transfer between 
developed regions in the north and underdeveloped regions in the interior.145 
 With the shifting role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – of which Mexico had 
been a member since its founding in 1945 – in the post-Bretton Woods, post-Nixon shock world, 
“Latin America’s foreign debt facilitated a political transformation … centered on free trade 
[that] enabled the recovery of large financial institutions and promoted the activities of 
transnational corporations.”146 In 1985, after twenty years of FDI, privatization efforts, and more 
recent tariff reduction, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which would be succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.147 This move 
further expanded the country’s internal development project into the realm of international trade 
and solidified institutional efforts to carve out a permanent spot for Mexico on the world stage. 
In 1987, the US-Canada FTA would successfully enter into force, inspiring the government of 
President Salinas to approach the United States about a potential similar deal with Mexico. 
Salinas would go on to tour across both nations, telling American audiences that multilateral 
economic integration would reduce immigration and promising Mexicans that a North American 
free trade agreement would bring Mexico into the First World, the quote most often associated 
with Mexican participation in NAFTA. While the agreement was debated over in the United 
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States, according to Quintana Romero, the Mexican government actually began instituting 
internal legal modifications that would prepare the economy for international competition 
(though, as previously established, certainly not enough). Institutional attitudes toward economic 
openness, corruption, and political freedoms, at least at face value, changed dramatically in order 
to prepare for entrance into a new stage of global development and, by extension, a shiny new 
period in Mexican history.148 In practice, however, while NAFTA might have helped the nation 
grow and develop if it had succeeded, it was also a last-ditch effort to legitimize an authoritarian 
state widely-considered within its own borders to be irredeemable and outdated.149 These 
reforms broke away from the nationalist rhetoric of the previous administrations and acted, in 
part, as an attempt to reinvigorate trust in the old PRI system, especially after the oil crisis and 
Lost Decade. Under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, Salinas’ government would 
institute a series of deregulation and denationalization policies, the most striking of which was 
the repeal of Article 27, the part of the Mexican constitution that guaranteed communal 
subsistence farmland known as ejidos and a defining policy of the post-Revolution era.150 The 
same year NAFTA went into effect, Mexico would join the OECD, cementing what would have 
been the ultimate culmination of a development project at least fifty years in the making.151  
This transformation would have been all well and good, should NAFTA not have so 
dramatically harmed the Mexican economy. Though economic convergence had been a stated 
commitment in the preamble, there were no explicit goals outlined to facilitate it.152 Mexicans 
loudly shared their concerns over NAFTA before and after it entered into force but these 
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concerns were never fully acknowledged. For the US and Canada, the FTA had been a much 
bigger deal, with Canada accepting its economic dependence on the US and the US accepting the 
value of international trade agreements. For both nations, “NAFTA was a bit of tinkering at the 
margin.”153 NAFTA was a comparatively small part of a larger, more diversified scheme of 
international trade. After it began to more or less fail, its failure was largely seen as a Mexican 
problem, blamed on its inability to fully realize the extent to which it should have instituted 
liberal reforms, though the extent to which it had reformed had already been to an extreme, 
previously unthinkable degree. The peso crisis briefly took up all the attention of the Mexican 
state, but with much of the Fox presidency (2000-2006) left in conflict between the PAN-
controlled executive and PRI-controlled legislature and the United States largely distracted by 
9/11, these concerns have been left on the cutting room floor, even with NAFTA’s renegotiation 
into USMCA.154 
After NAFTA, liberalization has only increased, with Mexico going on to sign twelve 
free trade agreements with forty-six countries, more than any other nation in the world, though 
they are largely irrelevant, seeing as the vast majority (up to 90%) of Mexico’s bilateral trade is 
with the United States.155 Citing the World Bank, according to García Zamora in 2014, “the 
promise that NAFTA would lead … Mexico into the First World has been completely 
contradicted by data … according to which the proportion of Mexicans living in poverty … is as 
high today as it was two decades ago: 52 of every 100 inhabitants.”156 Its economy today is 
overwhelmingly dependent on four sources of income: oil, remittances, the informal economy, 
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and drug trafficking.157 As stated by Juan Manuel Sandoval, “[Mexico] did become part of the 
first world … the backyard.”158 Salinas had wanted to “Taiwanize” Mexico, looking to the 
success of the so-called “Asian Tigers” and the European Union, as well as the anticipation built 
up from the success of the maquiladoras. Neoliberal transformation was part of a larger strategy 
that sought not only to develop Mexico, but to create the conditions under which it could become 
an international powerhouse.159 
 
Migration and Security 
A key part of this plan had also been repatriation.160 Leading up to NAFTA, the Mexican 
government had grown openly resentful of its diaspora in the United States, reflecting a belief 
that unauthorized migration harmed Mexico’s reputation internationally.161 Because they were so 
interconnected, with the dramatic rise in emigrants in the post-NAFTA economic crisis Mexico 
had to readdress both its development and migration strategies in tandem. In a report to the 
United Nations Security Council, former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon noted that 
“globalization has given rise to an exponential growth in the volume of international trade and 
movement of goods, money and persons” while at the same time “giving rise to massive 
opportunities for transnational organized crime and corruption to thrive.”162 Such is especially 
true for Mexico, which has seen a reinvention of organized crime since NAFTA’s institution. 
This anti-crime, anti-drug strategy has gradually become the new window by which both 
development and migration is framed. The first major step in this direction would be the creation 
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of the United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG) in 1996 and 
its primary project, the US-Mexico Binational Drug Strategy, first published in 1998 under the 
Clinton and Zedillo administrations. One of the key components officially outlined in the 
strategy documentation is the collaboration of the two nations on border security at “local, state, 
and federal levels.”163 Though relatively minor in terms of its execution ability – it holds both 
signatories to some kind of “establishment of measures” with which to move forward, though 
exact numbers and terminology are largely left out – the HLCG officially shifts US-Mexico 
bilateral migratory relations into a security dimension in the post-NAFTA era, setting the stage 
for Mexico to fully assume this direction of internal control.164 
Though, as previously established, President Vicente Fox would ultimately fail to garner 
real results with the US on NAFTA once 9/11 shifted American policy goals, he did succeed in 
initially bringing the Americans to the table. He had approached George W. Bush seeking a 
trilateral extension of the initial treaty specifically on the subject of migration, even reaching an 
eventual agreement that would never be fully realized. The agenda is divided into five key 
points, referred to by Jorge Castañeda, the Mexican Foreign Minister at the time, as the “whole 
enchilada.”165 These key points implicitly link migration, border security, and development: 
Point 4 calls for the strengthening of border security through intensified collaboration between 
the United States and Mexico (not necessarily a new idea) with a “special emphasis on … 
prevention of migrant deaths … and combating human trafficking,” while Point 5 calls for the 
extension of a “temporary worker program” in order to spur regional development.166 With slow 
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progress on the initial five post-9/11, the Mexican and American governments suggested further 
proposals for potential areas of bilateral collaboration, including “cooperation in border 
monitoring to reduce undocumented migration,” “[increased] cooperation at official border 
crossings,” and the “promotion of development strategies that tie in with migration.”167 Though 
talks would eventually dissolve without any concrete piece of legislation in place, it establishes a 
kind of false shared responsibility between the US and Mexico, emphasizing collaboration and 
cooperation but explicitly targeting issues for which Mexico, as the underdeveloped source of 
supposedly-criminal migrants, has the primary obligation to solve.  
 These talks would form a sufficient background for when NAFTA would actually be 
extended into the security dimension through the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(SPP). Though the SPP is the first free trade agreement to take on regional security, it does not 
have a reviewable text or single set of objectives and was not subject to congressional approval 
on either side of the US-Mexico border – purposefully so, considering the controversy that 
NAFTA had quickly become in both countries.168 It explicitly links neoliberal economics and 
security as its foundational pillars, with Thomas Shannon, the American Under-Secretary of 
State at the time, putting it plainly when he stated, “To a certain extent, we’re armoring 
NAFTA.”169 While Laura Carlsen puts much of the authority of the SPP on the Bush (Jr.) 
administration and its heightened counterterrorism agenda, it is clear from previous negotiations 
that Mexico was eager to enter into any discussions that would at least implicitly address 
migration. Though it refuses to explicitly address migration in content, it does define “migrants 
driven from their livelihoods by the loss of their own local and national markets to imports” – 
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such as, for example, Mexican migrants fleeing economic downturn or, later, Central American 
migrants fleeing similar conditions after the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2005 – as “international threats … subject to a series of 
enforcement-only measures,” setting the stage for a new status quo beginning in the mid-
2010s.170  
The SPP led directly into the Mérida Initiative (also called “Plan Mexico” after Plan 
Colombia, though their similarities are often overstated), a “regional security cooperation 
initiative” that amounted to US$400 million in military aid.171 As presented by President Bush 
(Jr.), one of its central purposes was to “bolster homeland security by impeding the flow of 
transnational criminal activity.”172 As Carlsen notes, the phrase “impeding the flow of 
transnational criminal activity” portrays criminality as a “contagion that spreads south to north,” 
revealing an underlying truth of the initiative similar to NAFTA. This project, like many in the 
past, was not really about whatever security or anti-drug strategy was on the table at the time, at 
least not totally. It always seemed to come back to migration for both the US and Mexico. 
Though over ten years out from the inauguration of NAFTA and even further from the beginning 
of its negotiation period, this relationship as seen under the scope of migration diplomacy once 
again has reared its head. Mexico, now embroiled in organized crime and on the verge of 
declaring a War on Drugs of its own, could once again use its status as a sending country to 
leverage investment from the United States, this time for military aid. Just as with NAFTA, 
immigration acts as an implicit (though, perhaps not deliberate) threat to the supposed American 
way of life, this time under the guise of the newly-created banner of “narco-terrorism.” This 
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investment, while not explicitly allocated for development in the traditional sense, is meant to 
foster growth of the Mexican security apparatus, a necessary form of statecraft in its own right. 
Vanessa Barker defines so-called “penal power and border control” as productive and “integral” 
to state “reconstruction,” a power with as much to do with the “polity itself” as it does with 
“tossing particular people out of the polity.”173 
In truth, migration, security, and development had always been linked when it came to 
NAFTA, with President George H.W. Bush saying in 1991 that, “by boosting economic 
prosperity in Mexico, Canada, and the United States, it will help us move forward on issues that 
concern all of us … such as drugs and education, immigration, and the environment.”174 Yet, it is 
the failure of Mexico’s primary development strategy as a result of NAFTA and the succession 
of the security agenda in its place that truly demonstrates this linkage. With the failure of 
NAFTA to successfully round off decades of development efforts, representing the ultimate 
failure of neoliberal reform as the vehicle of economic development, Mexico had to surmise 
another way to perform development that would not simply be repeating its mistakes of the past 
because, at its very core, development is as much about control as it is about resources. To say 
that the marker for development is solely national wealth is, at best, a shortsighted view that 
ignores the term’s implications. “Developed” states are not only wealthy, they are safe. They are 
politically stable. While Mexico could successfully participate in the WTO and was even invited 
into the OECD rather than having to apply, it became clear in the post-NAFTA era that the level 
of state control necessary to perform development, not just to enact it through economic policy, 
was not there. From at least the early 1940s, migration had been at the center of Mexican 
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development. It has always been and continues to be primarily associated with remittance 
income, but Mexico as a developmental migration state is, today, much more publicly concerned 
with the performance of development. This happens through a securitized lens because of the 
surge of migration in conjunction with organized crime during the post-NAFTA economic crisis. 
This is clear when one returns to a key impetus for this crisis in the first place. In 1994, investors 
had not initially been scared off by any sort of economic decisions made by the Mexican 
government – in fact, though some American economists would argue differently, many would 
say that Mexico had done a lot of things right when it came to liberalization, especially 
considering it had just come off of two different regional crises by the time NAFTA was in the 
works. What really seemed to spook them, as stated earlier in “The Peso Crisis,” was mounting 
political instability. Though Mexico had, at arguably varying levels, succeeded at the 
implementation of development policy, it had failed at development performance. With this 
failure, its strategy needed to change, keeping migration as its central tool. Instead of strategic 
emigration through work programs, or using the curbing of migration as an incentive for FDI, the 
outward approach became one in which migration was now the conduit of influences counter to 
development (crime, drug trafficking, etc.). Under this approach, the method of performing 
development became the thing which stopped, regulated, or otherwise scrutinized migration: the 
securitization of the border-zone and, by extension, militarization of border agents, which 




De Jesus 47 
 
A Fundamental Shift 
 This status quo, focused solely on the relationship between the United States and Mexico, 
does not tell the full story; demographics on the US-Mexico border have dramatically shifted in 
recent years, necessitating further assessment. Since roughly 2010, Mexican migration to the 
United States has actually been on the decline. Citing the Pew Hispanic Center, García Zamora 
writes that less than 100,000 undocumented people entered the United States in 2010, less than a 
fifth of the estimated 525,000 annually that had arrived between 2000 and 2006. From its peak at 
12 million in 2007, he also assumes a drop in the American undocumented population by 
hundreds of thousands to around 11.2 million.175 There are multiple reasons for this reduction, 
including the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009 and the prioritization of deportations during the 
Obama administration. The economic crisis in the late 2000s not only put many undocumented 
people out of work, but also reduced wages to the point that many who remained did not find it 
valuable to stay in the United States when they could find comparable work in Mexico.176 Ahn et 
al. mark 2008 and 2009 as the years with some of the highest number of removals in American 
history at 359,795 and 395,165 respectively.177 According to the Center for Migratory Studies at 
the Mexican National Institute of Migration, from 2010 to 2013 the US averaged 350,000 
deportations per year, and data collected by the Pew Research Center suggests that deportations 
went on to peak in 2013 at 432,281.178 At its height, the US was deporting over a thousand 
people per day and more than 10 percent of the federal prison population were there on 
immigration violations.179 
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 This shift coincided with a rising number of Central Americans seeking entry into the 
United States and, by extension, into Mexico. In 2014, according to Pew, for the first time the 
number of apprehensions of non-Mexicans exceeded apprehensions of Mexicans at the US-
Mexico border. Though numbers briefly declined in 2015, non-Mexicans have outnumbered 
Mexicans for every consecutive year since then. In 2019, migrants from Central America’s 
Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras), made up approximately 71 percent 
of the total 607,774 apprehensions. This was also the first year on record in which Mexicans did 
not represent the largest country of origin (at 166,458 apprehension), with it being outnumbered 
by apprehensions of Guatemalans (264,168) and Hondurans (253,795) despite the fact their 
individual populations each make up, on average, only around 10 percent of the Mexican 
population (at approximately 13% and 8% respectively).180 The majority of these Central 
Americans (who have also since been joined by migrants from South Asia, Haiti, and even Cuba) 
are also travelling for entirely different reasons than many Mexicans did in previous periods. As 
Hutchison writes, mitigating these arrivals is complicated by the “‘complex migration 
phenomenon’ of mixed migration,” in which there cannot be a single simple explanation or 
reason as to why these individuals have emigrated from their home countries.181 While previous 
migration flows from Mexico have been dominated by people seeking economic opportunity, 
many migrants today are often fleeing a combination of violence (political, domestic, or gang-
related), extreme economic insecurity, or environmental devastation from natural disaster. 
Mexico, as the window into the US, bears the brunt of land migration to the northern border-
zone, and as a result has played a key role in managing this flow of migrants. 
                                                          
180 Gramlich, John & Luis Noe-Bustamante. “What’s Happening at the US-Mexico Border in 5 Charts.” Pew 
Research Center. 1 November 2019. 
181 Hutchison, pg. 92. 
De Jesus 49 
 
 Leadership, especially in the period of Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) and 
Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador (AMLO) (2018-present), has assumed a position similar to that 
of the United States. 2015 marked a high for foreigners apprehended by Mexican immigration 
authorities at 198,141, 95.6 percent of whom were from Central America or the Caribbean.182 In 
2017, more than 80 percent of migrants traveling through Mexico were from just three countries: 
Guatemala (37.5%), Honduras (33.2%), and El Salvador (12.6%). Much like the American 
response to Mexican migrants post-NAFTA, Mexico has responded by further securitizing not 
only the US-Mexico border, for which it is dually responsible, but also its southern border with 
Guatemala and Belize. While Carlsen frames this situation as the US “[having] deputized” the 
Mexican government with the responsibility of the “preemptive strike” to Central Americans 
before they can reach the northern border, this is not an accurate representation of Mexico’s 
positionality in this relationship.183 In many ways, the US-Mexico relationship is one of deep 
power balance, that is clear, but specifically on the subject of migration and security – especially 
now that Mexicans are not the main target – they are closely aligned. Presidents Calderón (2006-
2012) and Peña Nieto touted programs which link migration and development, like the domestic 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (“National Development Plan,” PND) from 2013 to 2018, the 
annual Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (“Regional Conference on Migration,” CRM), and 
especially the 2008 Proyecto Mesoamérica (“The Mesoamerica Project,” PM). It, in 
combination, has also increased border securitization. President Calderón declared a Mexican 
War on Drugs just ten days into his term, a significant part of which has included increased 
military presence on their border with Guatemala. They have collaborated with the US on the 
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MPP (otherwise known as “Remain in Mexico”), which forces migrants to wait in Mexico while 
they await their American court hearings.184 In 2019, Mexico officially began detaining and 
holding Central American migrants.185 The same year, the AMLO administration began 
supplementing agents on the southern border with his brand new Guardia Nacional, which has 
been relatively popular across the political aisle.186 
Like the United States did when first securitizing against Mexican migrants, it has also 
taken up the mantle of corresponsabilidad, or a false shared responsibility with Central 
American nations.187 To project this shared responsibility, they use collectivizing language in the 
same vein as American assertions of regional defense. Instead of using divisive terminology that 
geographically separates Mexico from its southern neighbors, the government often speaks in the 
language of a region that is broadly Mesoamerican, including with it not only the Northern 
Triangle, but also Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and even Panama. It is clear, though, where this 
responsibility actually lies. Much like Mexico is to the US, Northern Triangle countries are much 
smaller (in population and landmass), weaker (economically and militarily), and more vulnerable 
(politically and geographically) than Mexico, and are at least perceived as being to blame for the 
complicated web of migration, security, and development that they now struggle within. While 
the Mexican government has assumed its role as the leader of Mesoamerica, much like the US 
has with North America, it has in turn reflected its position in the relationship to the north with 
its neighbors to the south. In the scope of migration diplomacy, it has gone from being mostly a 
sending country to now being mostly a transit state with some of the added responsibility of a 
                                                          
184 US Department of Homeland Security. “Migration Protection Protocols.” 24 January 2019. 
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receiving country, and in policy and rhetoric is starting to act like it. This is why, when 
discussing the origins of migrant securitization on the US-Mexico border, it is vital to center 
Mexico, because the issue began as one between them and the Americans but has evolved into 
one in which Mexico has become a bridge between regions, transforming it into a key 
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Conclusions 
 By analyzing the relationship between the United States and Mexico as it relates to the 
inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement, this study demonstrates said 
agreement as the point of origin for modern border securitization between the two nations. While 
the American news media has been eager to assign blame to the Trump administration, or extend 
it further back to the Obama administration, and academics have generally been keener to look at 
the Bush administration in the years after 9/11, these periods are too late. By first exploring the 
context surrounding the negotiation of NAFTA, American fears of job loss, and the agreement’s 
economic consequences in Mexico using the framework of migration diplomacy, one can then 
see the surge in immigration it caused and understand the security response it provoked in the 
United States. This perspective, however, does tell the full story. From there, looking further at 
specifically the significance of NAFTA in Mexico, one can see that it represented the apex of a 
decades-long development project, and its failure necessitated a reworking of Mexican 
development strategy. This reworking, responding to a rise in organized crime and following the 
lead of the United States, resulted in the reframing of migrants as threats to public and economic 
security. To combat this perceived threat, Mexico began to prioritize border securitization as a 
method of internal control, what is labelled earlier as the “performance” of development. 
Keeping in mind the particular kind of relationship revealed between the US and Mexico and 
with demographics shifting overwhelming toward migrants coming from Central America’s 
Northern Triangle, one can see that Mexico has begun to take up a similar positionality to the 
United States as it makes the transition from being a mostly-sending country to a mostly-transit 
and partial-receiving country. Through this series of examinations and temporal connections, 
there comes to form a clear progression of policy choices that leads directly from NAFTA to 
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both the US-Mexico and the Mexico-Guatemala borders today. Understanding this evolution is 
vital if activists and policymakers wish to truly alleviate and solve the situation at the border. 
After all, though the DHS, ICE, and CBP are all functioning at or greater than their original 
capacity, the Trump administration has officially been voted out of office and yet the so-called 
“crisis” in the border-zone remains. On April 2, 2021, the Washington Post reported that March 
of 2021 saw the highest monthly total for border apprehensions in sixteen years at more than 
171,000.188 
Of course, there is much more research to be done, especially considering the shift in 
migration demographics in the border-zone is relatively recent. Mexicans made up the vast 
majority of migrants coming through the US-Mexico border since the creation of the modern 
border-zone in 1848. There needs to be not only a fundamental reassessment in what time 
periods, events, and administrations we assign blame for the border situation, but also simply 
more time. It has been less than a decade since non-Mexican migrants began outnumbering 
Mexicans, and assessments of these migratory relationships may change as further truths are 
revealed in the years and decades. Additionally, for brevity’s sake, there are multiple elements 
which some may consider key parts of this analysis that have been left out. Though American 
partisan politics are largely ignored in this study – purposefully so, considering there is 
significantly less focus paid to US internal decision-making – the absence of a section which 
explores the Mexican party system as it relates to NAFTA and security is not lost. The fact that 
the time period in focus crosses over the fall of Mexico’s one-party state (Salinas, Zedillo), the 
rise of the conservative opposition (Fox, Calderón), a return to the PRI (Peña Nieto), and a 
                                                          
188 Miroff, Nick. “Border Crossings in March Jumped to Highest Level in 15 Years, Data Shows.” The Washington 
Post. 2 April 2021. 
De Jesus 54 
 
landslide victory to a classical revolutionary opposition (AMLO) undoubtedly plays a role, and 
should be thoroughly explored in further research on this subject. 
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